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chapter 3
Winckelmann’s Greek Ideal and Kant’s Critical
Philosophy
Michael Baur
Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68) was not a philosopher. In fact,
Winckelmann had a strong interest in distancing himself from academic
philosophy as he knew it. As Goethe reports, Winckelmann “complained
bitterly about the philosophers of his time and about their extensive
inﬂuence.”1 Still less was Winckelmann a Kantian philosopher; the ﬁrst
edition of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason did not appear until
1781, thirteen years after the ﬁfty-year-old Winckelmann was shockingly
murdered in Trieste. Nevertheless, many of Winckelmann’s ideas were
philosophically rich and suggestive and interestingly relevant to the
philosophical problems that were later to be addressed by Kant and his
philosophical contemporaries. It is no wonder, then, that Winckelmann’s
inﬂuence can be detected in the works of some of the most important
philosophically oriented thinkers of Germany in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. In addition to Kant himself, these thinkers
included Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81), Johann Gottfried von
Herder (1744–1803), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832),
Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770–1831).
3.1 Winckelmann’s Contribution: His Precursors and His
Innovations
Winckelmann is widely regarded as the inventor of what we now call “art
history.”To be sure, there were others beforeWinckelmann who sought to
analyze great artworks against the backdrop of their historical settings, but
such predecessors tended to focus on the lives of the individual artists who
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert (Tübingen: Cotta, 1805); cited
here from Schriften zur Kunst, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Erich Trunz, vol. 12 (Munich: DTV, 2008), 119.
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produced the art in question (as in the work of Giorgio Vasari2), or else
they tended to compile facts about artworks from the past, without,
however, developing a fuller account of the broader aesthetic, cultural,
and ideological contexts that informed and made possible the particular
artworks in question. One of Winckelmann’s innovations was to develop
a way of doing “art history” that was vastly more comprehensive in scope
and more systematic in its aspirations than the previous work of “art
historians” had been. With his major contribution to art history – his
History of the Art of Antiquity (Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums) –
Winckelmann was able to illuminate the history and character of entire
cultures, and he did so through the lens of aesthetic taste, since – for
Winckelmann – a people’s aesthetic sensibility permeates and manifests
itself in all forms of cultural expression.
In the Preface to his History of the Art of Antiquity, Winckelmann
announces that his own endeavors in art history will go well beyond the
aims of those that preceded him: “The history of the art of antiquity that
I have endeavored to write is no mere narrative of the chronology and
alterations of art, for I take the word history in the wider sense that it has in
the Greek language and my intention is to provide an attempt at an
instructional ediﬁce [ein Versuch eines Lehrgebäudes zu liefern].”3
In summarizing the broader aim of Winckelmann’s History of the Art of
Antiquity, Elisabeth Décultot explains: “This work, more than a strictly
artistic history of antiquity, purports to be a history of the political,
climactic, social, sociological, and historical conditions that accompanied
the development of art in the ancient world. In short, the Geschichte der
Kunst purports to be the history of a culture.”4
In some respects, Winckelmann’s broader “cultural-historical
approach” to art and art history was not entirely new. One among other
precursors toWinckelmann’s broader approach was Anne Claude Philippe
de Tubières, comte de Caylus (1692–1765). Through his work (most
famously through his Recueil d’antiquités égyptiennes, étrusques, grecques et
2 Vasari’s most famous work is Le Vite de’ più eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori (Fiorenza: Lorenzo
Torrentino, 1550). Expanded in 1568, it is available in a contemporary and abridged English
translation as The Lives of the Artists, trans. Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3 Johann JoachimWinckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, ed. Adolf H . Borbein, Thomas
W. Gaehtgens, Johannes Irmscher, and Max Kunze (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2002),
“Vorrede,” p. xvi (hereafter “GKA”). A contemporary English translation can be found in History of
the Art of Antiquity, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Publications, 2006),
“Preface,” p. 71 (hereafter “HAA”).
4 Décultot 2000, 261.
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romaines5), Caylus was able to show how an understanding of the entire
character and culture of a people could be derived from an aesthetically
informed appreciation of the artworks they left behind. For Caylus,
a people’s way of thinking, or “turn of mind,” was made manifest in
their aesthetic sensibility and their artistic expressions no less than it was
made manifest in their more deliberate, written self-expressions. Caylus
explains:
By re-examining the precious remains of the ancients, you are able to
conceive a sure idea of their taste. The arts carry the character of the nations
that have cultivated them; you sort out their beginning, their infancy, and
the point of perfection where they have been taken by every people. If it is
permitted to speak in this way: one is no better able to distinguish the taste
of these people, their customs, their turn of mind, in the books that they
have left us, than in the works of painting and sculpture that have survived
until our time. A glance cast rapidly over one of those cabinets, where such
treasures are assembled, embraces in a way the picture of all the centuries.6
And just as it is possible to obtain an understanding of a people’s entire
culture and character by developing an aesthetically informed appreciation
of their artworks, so too it is possible to rely on that aesthetic-cultural
understanding to arrive at a fuller and more precise theoretical knowledge
about those artworks, including knowledge about their place of origin and
their chronological dating. For Caylus, there is something like a “law of
nature” according to which the artworks deriving from a particular time
and place will naturally manifest a certain distinctive character or mind-set.
And so an aesthetically astute modern-day scholar can include “taste”
among the various research tools that might be used for the purpose of
accurately locating older artworks within their proper historical time
period and geographic place. In other words, the scholar need not be
a scholar alone and need not rely only on the explicit writings or inscrip-
tions of ancient peoples but could be a connoisseur-scholar whose sense of
taste could be used in the service of research and scholarship. Referring to
the “law of nature” that can be used to establish linkages between the
qualitative, aesthetic character of artworks and their quantiﬁable place-
ment within space and time, Caylus observes:
5 See Anne Claude Philippe de Tubières, comte de Caylus, Recueil d’Antiquités, Recueil d’antiquités
égyptiennes, étrusques, grecques, et romaines, 7 vols. (Paris: Desaint & Sailant, 1752–67); volume 3 bears
the title Recueil d’Antiquités, Recueil d’antiquités égyptiennes, étrusques, grecques, romaines, et gauloises.
6 Caylus, Recueil, vol. 2, p. i.
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This constancy, or this law that nature seems to impose more or less on all
nations, must be seen as an advantage; without it posterity would not be able
to distinguish either the period or the place of origin of monuments; and the
means of recognition would be conﬁned solely to inscriptions.7
The work of Caylus (among others) marks an important step in the
development of modern art history because it represents an attempt at
combining the seemingly disparate endeavors of aesthetic connoisseurship,
on the one hand, and antiquarian scholarship, on the other, or, one might
say, it represents an attempt at closing the traditional gap between the more
qualitative, aesthetic, evaluative dimensions of art history and the more
quantitative, nonaesthetic, descriptive dimensions. But even Caylus’s work
fell short of the larger systematic and normative imperative that suffused
Winckelmann’s work and made it so unique and attractive to his audience.
We might begin to appreciate how Winckelmann’s work was so inno-
vative and so appealing to his audience if we consider one of his more
seemingly outlandish statements regarding the art historians that preceded
him. At the beginning of his History of the Art of the Antiquity,
Winckelmann claims that “[s]ome writings with the title History of Art
have appeared, but art has played only a negligible part in them.”8 It seems
genuinely outrageous to say that art has played only a “negligible part” in
previous works on the history of art. After all, even pre-Winckelmannian
works in the history of art (despite the many other shortcomings that they
may have had) really do seem to have been substantially (not just negli-
gibly) about art. But Winckelmann goes on to explain himself: even if
previous histories of art have, in some measure, been about art, they have
failed to tell us what art itself is about. That is to say, they have failed to
address art precisely as art. The problem with such prior art histories, says
Winckelmann, is that “[t]heir authors were insufﬁciently conversant with
art and could communicate only what they gleaned from books or hearsay.
Almost no one has guided us into the essence and towards the interior of art
[in das Wesen und zu dem Innern der Kunst], and those who have dealt with
antiquities have only raised points on which they could display their
learning.”9
If a genuine history of art should guide us “into the essence” and
“towards the interior” of art, then what might this mean in concrete
terms? And what, after all, is the “essence” or the “interior” of art?
Winckelmann does not address these questions with philosophical direct-
ness or precision, but he begins to suggest what he has in mind when he
7 Caylus, Recueil, vol. 5, p. 92. 8 HAA 71; GKA xvi. 9 Ibid.
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tells us about his interest in art and the art of the ancient Greeks in
particular.
The art of the Greeks is the principal concern of this history, and it requires –
as the most worthy object for observation and imitation [als der würdigste
Vorwurf zur Betrachtung und Nachahmung] insofar as it has preserved itself
in countless beautiful monuments – an elaborate investigation: one that
consists not in pointing to imperfect qualities and in explanations from the
conceited, but rather in a lesson on what is essential [sondern im Unterricht
des Wesentlichen]; a lesson which conveys not mere skills for the sake of
knowledge [nicht bloβ Kenntnisse zum Wissen], but rather also teachings for
the sake of practice [sondern auch Lehren zum Ausüben]. The discussion of
the art of the Egyptians, the Etruscans, and other peoples can broaden our
concepts and can lead to correctness in judgment; but the discussion of
Greek art should seek to determine itself on the basis of the one and the true,
with the aim of establishing a rule for judging and doing [auf eins und auf das
Wahre zu bestimmen, zur Regel im Urteilen und im Wirken].10
One might say that whatWinckelmann proposes in hisHistory of the Art of
Antiquity is to do art history in a way that is guided by our very vocation as
human beings. For Winckelmann, our interest in art is connected to our
interest in the “most worthy object” that we can observe and imitate, and
this interest does not ﬁnd its satisfaction merely in book-learning or in
knowing for the sake of knowing. It pertains rather to our very own activity
insofar as we engage in acts of judging and doing, and this activity cannot
be properly oriented unless it is guided by a concern for “the one and the
true.” In short, Winckelmann’s suggestion is that our interest in art (and in
ancient Greek art especially) is intimately bound up with our very nature as
human beings because as human beings – as doers as well as knowers – we
cannot be indifferent to the one and the true.
If one of Caylus’s primary contributions to art history consisted of the
move toward narrowing the gap between connoisseurship and scholarship
(between qualitatively oriented art appreciation and quantitatively
oriented research), then perhaps it is accurate to say that one of
Winckelmann’s primary contributions consisted in the move toward nar-
rowing the gap between what we know and what we do in our encounters
with art, between what we see and what we become in the midst of our
seeing, between our vocation as knowers and our vocation as doers,
between theoretical reason and practical reason, and – ultimately –
between the past, seemingly defunct world of ancient Greece and our
10 HAA 186; GKA 128.
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own present, seemingly living modern world. The stunning vision that
Winckelmann puts forward in his History of the Art of Antiquity – and
elsewhere – is a vision that suggests that the modern world is more
fragmented and dead and the remnants of the ancient Greek world more
pregnant and alive than we moderns realize and that if we pay attention to
the ancient Greeks and their artwork, we stand to learn a great deal about
our own nature and vocation as human beings.
Hegel was speaking for a large number of thinkers in his generation
when he observed that Winckelmann’s interest in art was an interest that
touched on the “highest interest of humanity.” According to Hegel:
Winckelmann was inspired in such a way that he opened up a new meaning
for the observation of art, and he wrested art away from the perspectives
belonging to coarse aims and to the mere imitation of nature, and he
provided a powerful impetus towards ﬁnding the idea of art in works of
art and in the history of art. For Winckelmann is to be regarded as one of
those men who, in the ﬁeld of art, knew how to open up a new organ for
spirit [für den Geist ein neues Organ] and an entirely new way of observing.11
Like Winckelmann before him and Hegel after him, Kant also recog-
nized that an interest in art and aesthetic taste is not a merely “academic” or
“specialized” interest but an interest that is exceedingly relevant to our
deepest interests as human beings. And like Hegel, Kant also praised
Winckelmann for having taken important steps beyond a merely “sensua-
listic” account of aesthetic taste. According to the sensualistic view, when
a person makes a judgment of taste (when a person judges that this or that
is “beautiful”), that person is essentially doing nothing more than declaring
that the allegedly “beautiful” object happens to give satisfaction to him or
her, thanks to the particular, contingent, individual-relative desires or
interests that happen to condition his or her feeling of satisfaction. But
just as a judgment about contingently connected perceptions is not really
a judgment about any “object” as such,12 so too a judgment about how one
happens to be physiologically affected by a thing is not really a judgment
about beauty or a judgment of taste. A judgment of taste is not only about
what is idiosyncratically or physiologically agreeable to a person but also
about something that calls for – even if it does not and cannot bring
about – intersubjective agreement or recognition from others. In a set of
11 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. 13: Vorlesungen uber die Aesthetik I, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl
Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 91.
12 For more on this, see Kant’s distinction between “judgments of perception” and “judgments of
experience” in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, §§18–20 (Pro 4:298–301).
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unpublished notes, Kant gives credit to Winckelmann for having recog-
nized this much about beauty and aesthetic taste.
By means of taste I judge of the object, whether my state is much or little
affected by it. If I call it beautiful, I do not thereby declare merely my own
satisfaction, but also that it should please others. We are ashamed when our
taste does not correspond to that of others. In matters of taste one must
distinguish charm from beauty; the former is often lost in this or that, but
the beauty remains. The decorated room always remains beautiful, but it has
lost its charm with the death of the beloved, and the lover chooses other
objects. This concept of beauty, says Winckelmann, is sensual, i.e., one does
not distinguish the charm from the beauty.13
3.2 Winckelmann on the Greek Ideal and Imitation of the Greeks
What, for Winckelmann, does beauty reveal to us that addresses our very
vocation as human beings? And why doesWinckelmann regard the Greeks
as especially important for showing us how we ought to relate to beauty,
and to our own selves, through beauty? Winckelmann’s suggested answers
to these questions are widely dispersed throughout his writings, and they
are not always developed with complete clarity and rigor. But one can
begin to appreciate Winckelmann’s thinking on these topics by consider-
ing why he regarded the ancient Greeks as such unique and compelling
models of human excellence.
It was bymeans of freedom that the thinking of an entire people rose up, like
a noble branch from a healthy trunk. For just as the spirit of an individual
accustomed to thought tends to rise higher in a wide ﬁeld or on an open
path or at the top of a building than it does in a low chamber or in any
restricted place, so also the way of thinking among the free Greeks must
have been very different from the concepts of dominated peoples . . . Greeks
in their prime were thinking beings: they were already thinking twenty years
or more before we generally begin to think for ourselves, and they fostered
their spirit when it was most ﬁred up by the liveliness of the body, whereas
with us the spirit is ignobly nourished until it falls into decline.14
Two things are especially noteworthy in this passage. First, Winckelmann
suggests that the Greeks were able to think more naturally, more readily,
more nobly, and more freely than we moderns are currently able.
And second, their more excellent freedom and nobility of thought were
not simply a function of their own doing or their own achievement.
13 NF 15:280–81. 14 HAA 188; GKA 233.
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TheGreeks were able to become the exquisitely free, noble-thinking beings
that they had become because they were surrounded by an especially
freedom-conducive condition that they themselves did not choose and
could not have chosen. In paraphrasing Winckelmann’s point, one might
say that just as the mind of a man accustomed to reﬂection tends to rise
higher in a wide ﬁeld than in any restricted place, so too the minds of the
Greeks tended to rise higher than our own modern minds because the
Greeks – unlike us moderns – were gifted with natural, unchosen condi-
tions that favored and made possible their noble free-thinking.
Winckelmann is well known for his argument (an argument that is
indebted to similar arguments in Dubos and Montesquieu15) that the
ancient Greeks’ exceptional freedom of action and thought were what we
might call a “situated” or “environmentally conditioned” freedom.
The Greeks would not have become the people they did become if it
were not for the natural and unchosen conditions (including the geo-
graphic, climatic, hereditary, ethnic, and physicobiological conditions)
into which they were born.
In one of his most famous and oft-quoted statements, Winckelmann
tells us that “[t]he only way for us to become great or, if this be possible,
inimitable, is to imitate the ancients.”16 But one may well ask, How can we
become great by imitating the ancient Greeks if their greatness consisted
(at least in part) in their exercise of a most excellent form of freedom that is
superior to our own and if imitation (by its very nature) seems to entail
a kind of slavishness or following, which is the very opposite of being free?
Furthermore, how can we become inimitable by imitating the Greeks
when our imitation of them would imply that they are not inimitable
(after all, they will have been imitated by us)? And so it seems that if we
were to imitate the Greeks, then we ourselves – like them – would also not
be inimitable.
Winckelmann’s overtly paradoxical language takes on a more subtle,
revealing character if one considers what Winckelmann has in mind when
he talks about “imitation” (Nachahmung). In various works of his,
Winckelmann points out that “imitation” for him is not the same thing
15 See especially Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s 1719 work, Critical Reﬂections on Poetry and Painting (Réﬂexions
critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture), and Montesquieu’s 1748 work, On the Spirit of the Laws (De
l’Esprit des lois).
16 J.J. Winckelmann, Gedancken über die Nachahmung der Griechischen Wercke in der Mahlerey und
Bildhauer-Kunst (1st edn, 1755), in Kleine Schriften: Vorreden, Entwürfe, edWalther Rehm (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1968), 27–59, here 29 (hereafter “GNGW”). An English translation can be found in
Reﬂections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture, trans. Elfriede Heyer and
Roger C. Norton (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 5 (hereafter “RIGW”).
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as copying. For example, in his “Reminder about the Observation of
Works of Art,” Winckelmann distinguishes between artistic production,
which is based on genuine thinking, and that which is based on mere
copying. In accordance with this distinction,Winckelmann advises would-
be connoisseurs: “With regard to the maker of the work you are observing,
pay attention to whether he himself engaged in thinking or instead only
copied [selbst gedacht oder nur nachgemachet hat]; whether he knew the
noblest aim of art, beauty, or instead only depicted things in accordance
with the commonplace forms known to him.”17 Winckelmann goes on to
explain:
What I oppose to one’s own thinking is copying, not imitation [Gegen das
eigene Denken setze ich das Nachmachen, nicht die Nachahmung]. Copying is
what I understand to be slavish following [die knechtische Folge]. But with
imitation, what is imitated, if it is done with reason, can take on another
nature [eine andere Natur annehmen], so to speak, and can become some-
thing in its own right [etwas eigenes werden].18
The argument seems to be that when something is properly imitated, there
is a sense in which the thing being imitated takes on another nature, and in
taking on another nature, it becomes something in its own right; that is, it
becomes something that is not merely a replication but is instead novel
(“another nature”) and unique (“something in its own right”). But how can
imitation generate something novel and unique? For Winckelmann, the
answer has to do with the fact that imitation consists of a kind of idealiza-
tion, or a kind of “projection” that takes place within the understanding.
In the masterpieces of Greek art, connoisseurs and imitators [Kenner und
Nachahmer] ﬁnd not only nature at its most beautiful but also something
more than nature [sondern noch mehr als Natur], namely certain ideal forms
of its beauty, which, as the ancient interpreter of Plato teaches, are made
from depictions projected only in the understanding [von Bildern bloβ im
Verstande entworfen, gemacht sind].19
17 Erinnerung über die Betrachtung der Werke der Kunst, in Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Kleine
Schriften: Vorrede, Entwürfe, 2nd edn (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 149–56, here 149 (hereafter
”EBWK”). For an English translation, see “Recalling the Observation of Works of Art,” in
Johann Winckelmann on Art, Architecture, and Archaeology, trans. David Carter (Rochester, NY:
Camden House, 2013), 129 (hereafter ”ROWA”).
18 EBWK 151; ROWA 130.
19 GNGW 30; RIGW 7. Along similar lines, Winckelmann observes a bit later in his Reﬂections that
“[t]hese frequent opportunities to observe nature prompted the Greek artists to go even further: they
began to form certain general concepts of the beauties of the individual parts as well as of the overall
proportions of bodies, beauties which were to be elevated above nature itself; their archetype was
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With his mention of “the ancient interpreter of Plato,” Winckelmann is
thinking about Proclus and his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. In that
commentary, Proclus refers to Phidias’s making of the famous statue of
Zeus and offers an interpretation of the metaphysical views presented in
Plato’s Timaeus. According to Proclus, the demiurge is the maker of the
world, and the sculptor is the maker of the statue, but the beauty that is
manifest in the world or in the statue does not comemerely from themaker
(whether this maker be the demiurge or the sculptor) but rather from the
model (paradeigma) or the Platonic idea.20
For Winckelmann, “imitation” of the beautiful in art and nature clearly
has something to do with Platonic ideas and with the way in which such
ideas are apprehended through a kind of “idealization” or “projection” in
the understanding. Winckelmann’s suggestion is that it is only by means of
“idealization” or “projection” that what is beautiful or true in nature can
make its appearance to us in the ﬁrst place. Along these lines,
Winckelmann explains that a draftsman “who wants to give the character
of truth to his academic studies will not achieve even a shadow of the true”
if he is incapable of going beyond what is merely given, and “if he does not
provide his own substitute [ohne eigene Ersetzung] for what the art-model’s
unmoved and indifferent soul fails to feel.”21 In a similar vein,
Winckelmann says that it is the beauty that is made and observed in
artwork (i.e., an imitated, idealized, and projected beauty) that teaches us
how to observe beauty in nature and not the other way around. Even “the
great Bernini,” who wrongly held that beauty is to be apprehended
primarily in nature and only secondarily in art, learned to observe beauty
in nature because he had ﬁrst observed beauty in art: “So it was the Venus
[of Medici] that taught [Bernini] to discover beauties in nature – beauties
which previously he had believed could be found only in nature and which,
without the Venus, he would not have looked for in nature.”22
There is a twofold explanation for why beauty in art teaches us how to
observe beauty in nature and not the other way around. First of all, for
Winckelmann, the beautiful as such (whether in nature or in artwork)
consists in a kind of unity-in-diversity or (what amounts to the same thing)
a spiritual nature which was projected only in the understanding [ihr Urbild war eine bloss im
Verstande entworfene geistige Natur]” (GNGW 34; RIGW 15).
20 The standard source for material from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus is the Teubner edition,
which allows for citations of volume number, page number, and line number: Procli in Platonis
Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–6). The material referenced
here comes from Proclus’ commentary at I.265.18–26.
21 GNGW 33; RIGW 13. 22 GNGW 37; RIGW 19.
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a diversity-in-unity. The beautiful “consists in the harmony of parts”23 or
in “manifoldness within the simple [bestehet in der Mannifaltigkeit im
Einfachen].”24 And second, the harmony-in-complexity, or unity-in-
diversity that constitutes the beautiful, is manifested more perfectly in
great artwork than in nature because in nature the elements of the beautiful
are more fragmented and dispersed; thus “the beauty of Greek statues is . . .
more moving, and not so dispersed but rather more united in one, than the
beauty of nature.”25 These considerations also explain why, for
Winckelmann, great artists are great precisely to the extent that they are
able to reveal more by means of less (they are able to show greater complex-
ity by means of greater simplicity). As Winckelmann explains:
it is more difﬁcult to indicate much by means of a little [viel mit wenigem
anzuzeigen] than it is to do the opposite, and good sense prefers to bring
about its effects with less rather than more effort; similarly, it is possible for
a master-artist to make use of a single ﬁgure as the venue for all of his art.26
This is why great artists thrive on displaying their complex and multi-
faceted abilities by working with just one medium or one particular shape;
by contrast, inferior artists think that they can more impressively display
their craft by throwing together a variety of different gimmicks and
techniques. If a joke requires too much explanation, then it is not a good
joke; similarly, if an artwork tries to show too much by doing too much,
then it is not a good artwork. This helps us to understand why Raphael’s
depiction of Plato (in his School of Athens) is so beautiful; Raphael gently
points us in the direction of Plato, who, in turn, with just a simple move-
ment of one ﬁnger indicates a world of difference.27
In further elaborating on what he means by “imitation,” Winckelmann
distinguishes between, on the one hand, an inferior kind of imitative
activity that focuses only on the empirically given individual instances
and, on the other hand, a superior kind of imitative activity that starts with
individual instances but goes beyond them in the direction of general-
ization and universalization (uniﬁcation and oneness).
The imitation of the beauty of nature either is directed at an individual
model, or else it gathers observations from different individual models and
23 J. J. Winckelmann, Abhandlung von der Fähigkeit der Empﬁndung des Schönen in der Kunst, in Kleine
Schriften, 211–33, here 219 (hereafter “AFES”). For an English translation, see “Treatise on the
Capacity for Sensitivity to the Beautiful in Art and the Method of Teaching It,” in Johann
Winckelmann on Art, Architecture, and Archaeology, trans. David Carter (Rochester, NY: Camden
House, 2013), 155 (hereafter “TCSB”).
24 EBWK 152; ROWA 131. 25 GNGW 37; RIGW 19. 26 EBWK 150; ROWA 129.
27 See EBWK 149; ROWA 129.
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brings them into oneness. The former means making a copy based on
likeness, or a portrait [eine ähnliche Kopie, ein Porträt machen]; this path
leads to the Dutch way of making forms and ﬁgures. But the latter path is
the path to what is universally beautiful and to idealized depictions of the
universally beautiful; and this is the path that the Greeks took.28
For Winckelmann, the Greeks were truly excellent at imitating nature in
the superior sense of the word “imitation,” and we moderns can learn from
them precisely by imitating their imitation (or idealizing their idealiza-
tion). In trying to learn about beauty and oneness, we moderns should not
turn directly to nature but rather to the Greeks. Our imitation of the
Greeks
can teach us to be knowledgeable more quickly, because here in one object
can be found the essence of that which is dispersed throughout nature, and
what is more it can teach us how far the most beautiful nature can go in
boldly yet wisely rising above its own self [wie weit die schönste Natur sich
über sich selbst kühn, aber weislich erheben kann].29
But even as we look to the Greeks and try to imitate them, wemust not lose
sight of the fact that there is a signiﬁcant difference between them and us.
The difference, however, between them and us is this: the Greeks could
obtain these depictions – even if they were not taken from the more
beautiful bodies – through the opportunity that they had every day to
observe the beauty of nature, which, however, does not show itself to us
every day, and rarely in the way that the artist wishes.30
For Winckelmann, the Greeks were superior at imitating the beauty of
nature because the unity, harmony, and wholeness that constitute the
beautiful as such were already more actual and evident in the natural
conditions that surrounded them. Once again, these natural conditions
included conditions that were not and could not have been deliberately
chosen by them (e.g., geographic, climatic, hereditary, ethnic, and physi-
cobiological conditions) – and such unchosen and unchoosable conditions
are what made it possible for them to enjoy a superior freedom of action
and thought.
FromWinckelmann’s point of view, the common (modern) notion that
such “natural conditioning” must be opposed to genuine freedom is itself
a symptom of a modern, alienated, fragmented way of thinking, a way of
thinking that fails to recognize that beauty in things outside the observer
(e.g., in nature) is inseparable from beauty within the observer (within the
28 GNGW 37; RIGW 21. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.
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embodied, thinking, free human being). Recall that, for Winckelmann,
beauty consists of a kind of harmony of parts (a unity-in-diversity).
If a harmony of parts within the human observer allows the human
observer to act and think in a more capacious and more open-minded
(less fragmented and less constrained) way, then perhaps it becomes
possible to begin comprehending how the human observer can be genu-
inely free, even while this freedom remains conditioned by (inseparable
from) a harmony of parts outside the observer (e.g., in nature). And then,
in turn, perhaps it also becomes possible to begin comprehending how we
moderns can imitate the ancient Greeks, even if we can never copy or
replicate the unique freedom they enjoyed.
3.3 Winckelmann and Kant on Art and Beauty
Like Winckelmann, Kant recognized that art aims to do more than
merely copy or replicate what can be empirically observed in nature as
immediately given. But Kant’s thinking about art and aesthetic judg-
ment also diverged from Winckelmann’s in important ways. For Kant,
a key aim of art is to induce in the observer a kind of “free play”
among the observer’s faculties of mind (including the sensory faculty
of imagination and the thinking faculty of the understanding).
Because it induces this “free play” of faculties in the observer, art
provides the observer with a kind of sensuous presentation that
facilitates and enriches the observer’s thinking about (1) how it is
that the human observer’s faculties are perhaps suited or outﬁtted for
apprehending and relating to a causally governed natural world that
seems alien and externally given to the observer and also (2) how it is
that a natural, causally governed world that seems to be morally
indifferent and even inhospitable to the human observer’s aspirations
as a knower and as an agent is perhaps suited or outﬁtted for
conforming or accommodating itself to those aspirations.
Kant saw the need for art to play this quasi-mediating role, since his
critical philosophy had led him to conclude that we ﬁnite human knowers
are limited to obtaining knowledge of objects of possible experience and
perennially disbarred from apprehending things as they are in themselves
(including the things that constituted the traditional objects of special
metaphysics: mind, world, and God as they are in themselves). Along these
lines, Kant writes that “there is an incalculable gulf ﬁxed between the
domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the
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concept of freedom, as the supersensible.”31 Because of this gulf, Kant held
that it was impossible for us humans to arrive at theoretical knowledge
regarding how it is that the human being’s empirically uncaused activity as
a knower and as an agent might be related to the natural, causally governed
sensuous world as it appears to us within experience. Thus Kant states that
it is impossible for us, by means of theoretical reason, to effect any kind of
“transition” from the realm of freedom to the realm of nature.32 However,
Kant also realized that we are embodied rational beings who seek to live
within the context of a sensuously given, causally governed natural world,
and so we live and act with the hope and expectation that this sensuously
given natural world is ultimately conformable to our human ends and that
our striving to know and to change that world for the better are not foolish
and futile. Even if we cannot know (as a matter of theoretical reason)
whether and how a transition from “freedom” to “nature” is to be achieved,
we inescapably live in accordance with the idea that such a transition ought
to be achieved. On Kant’s view, art provides us with a means for living,
acting, and thinking in accordance with this “ought,” and so for Kant, as
for Winckelmann, the making and the observing of art are deeply bound
up with our very vocation as human beings.
In contrast with Kant, Winckelmann offers what is arguably a more
radical view of what art is for and what art can do in the service of our
vocation as human beings. Even if art induces in us what Kant calls
a “free play” of the faculties, Winckelmann holds that art can do more
than that by enabling us to “see” the world altogether differently, and
in enabling us to “see” the world altogether differently, it can emanci-
pate us to “be” in the world altogether differently. Furthermore,
Winckelmann suggests that if we are to “be” in the world differently,
then we must be willing to question and possibly give up the view that
our activity as knowers and doers occurs through the operation of
faculties that are somehow found or discovered by us as already
fragmented and separated from one another. Perhaps, Winckelmann
suggests, the appearance that our faculties (e.g., our sensuous and
intellectual faculties) are already fragmented and separated from one
another (as a matter of “natural” or “transcendental” necessity) may
itself be a function of our own activity, a function of the way that we
ourselves (apart from any “natural” or “transcendental” necessity) con-
tinue to “see” and to “be” in the (modern, fragmented) world.
31 “Introduction,” §II, CPJ 5:175–76. 32 “Introduction,” §II, CPJ 5:176.
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One might say that Winckelmann’s primary aim is not just to get us to
see more in artworks but also to get us to be more by means of our seeing.
And forWinckelmann, the more we see the unity-in-diversity that is beauty
(e.g., beauty in ancient Greek artworks), the more we ourselves can be the
unity-in-diversity that is beauty. Furthermore, we do not come to be this
unity-in-diversity (this beauty) simply by means of a deliberate choosing,
judging, or mastery of concepts; we can come to be this unity-in-diversity
only by letting ourselves be addressed by a unity-in-diversity that is beauty
outside of us. Conversely, our letting ourselves be addressed by the beauti-
ful outside of us cannot simply be a matter of allowing ourselves to be
passively, or empirically, or physiologically affected; instead, it also requires
our own thinking activity. As noted earlier, Winckelmann believes that
beauty can be perceived only by means of our own “projection” in thought
or understanding; without such an idealizing projection, beauty (even
merely natural beauty) cannot even make its appearance in the ﬁrst place.
Kant would agree with Winckelmann’s idea that if we are to appreciate
beauty at all (whether in nature or in artworks), we cannot be merely
passive, sensuously determined beings but must also be active, in some
sense, as thinking beings. But Kant differs from Winckelmann on the
question of what we are capable of achieving as thinking beings, and this
difference leads Kant to diverge in important ways from Winckelmann’s
views on art and aesthetic judgment. Unlike Winckelmann, Kant is
committed to the view that our thinking activity is “bounded on the
outside,” so to speak, by what is external to it. This view is implicit in
Kant’s belief that our very own cognitive faculties (e.g., our sensory and our
thinking faculties) are to be found or discovered by us as separate and
“bounded on the outside” relative to one another. And because our think-
ing activity is bounded on the outside by what is external to it (and what is
“external” here includes not only the nature that is outside of our bodies
but also the bodily, natural determinations of our very own sensory and
imaginative faculties), Kant holds that our thinking activity is disbarred
from apprehending being as it is “in itself” and is limited to apprehending
being only as it is “for us.” Accordingly, Kant also holds that we cannot
really say that our appreciation of beauty is an appreciation of anything
that is genuinely beautiful (or one or true) “in itself”; in the ﬁnal analysis,
Kant’s explanation of our appreciation of beauty is not an account of what
is “in itself” but rather an account of a “free play” of faculties within us.
Recall now what Winckelmann says about the “essence” or the “inter-
ior” of art: art fundamentally has to do with our interest, as human beings,
in “the one and the true.” And when Winckelmann talks about “the one
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and the true,” he means (unlike Kant) the one and the true as they are “in
themselves” and not merely “for us.” Winckelmann thus holds that our
judgments of taste and our appreciation of beauty really are about what is
genuinely beautiful (or one or true) “in itself.” Recall also that, for
Winckelmann, it is not possible for us to apprehend the beautiful (not
even the beautiful in nature alone) if we ourselves do not engage in a certain
kind of thinking activity: the activity of “imitation,” whereby we bring
about a certain kind of idealizing “projection” in thought or understand-
ing. But how can Winckelmann coherently hold that we are able to
apprehend what is beautiful “in itself,” even though this apprehension
takes place only by means of a thinking activity (a “projection” or “idea-
lization”) that we ourselves actively undertake? Why isn’t it the case for
Winckelmann (as it is for Kant) that our own thinking activity ends up
barring us from apprehending the beautiful (or the one or the true) as it is
“in itself”?
The answer is that for Winckelmann, our thinking activity of “imita-
tion” or “projection” does not have to be construed as a merely subjective
or one-sided activity, or as an activity that emanates merely from us, and so
it does not have to be construed as an activity that operates as an external,
deforming sort of imposition on some already-given “know-not-what” that
gets distortedly apprehended by us. For Winckelmann, there is no “natu-
rally” or “transcendentally” compelling reason why the intellectual activity
of “imitation” or “projection” cannot also be the activity of what is
thoughtfully apprehended, just as it is the activity of the thoughtful
apprehender. For Winckelmann, if we learn properly from the Greeks (if
we ﬁrst imitate their imitation rather than imitate nature directly), we may
eventually come to see how our own activity of imitating nature can be
understood – truly – as being nothing other than the activity of nature
“rising above its own self.”33 If we look to the Greeks, we may come to see
how our own imitative, projective, idealizing depictions of nature are not
merely arbitrary, distorting, subjective impositions of our own doing but
rather depictions of nature as nature in itself “demands to be depicted.”34
33 GNGW 38; RIGW 21.
34 GNGW 39; RIGW 23. The full passage here reads as follows: “Nothing would more clearly show the
advantage of imitating the ancients over imitating nature [den Vorzug der Nachahmung der Alten vor
der Nachahmung der Natur] than if one were to take two young people with equally beautiful talent,
and have one of them study antiquity and the other study only nature. The latter would depict
nature as he found it [Dieser würde die Natur bilden, wie er sie ﬁndet] . . . but the former would depict
nature as it demands to be depicted [jener aber würde die Nature bilden, wie sie es verlanget].”
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Winckelmann’s argument seems to be, then, that the actualization of
our own projective, idealizing, thinking activity (our activity of “imita-
tion”) is not to be understood as something that is separable from the
actualization of what is genuinely true and beautiful (what is a genuine
harmony of parts or a unity-in-diversity) “in itself.” So Winckelmann
seems to be claiming that it is possible for us to engage in some version
of what Kant would have called “intellectual intuition”: a nonsensory,
intellectual kind of intuition by means of which the activity of thinking
apprehends that which is “in itself” even though that which is “in itself”
does not have any being (not even any hidden, unknowable being “in
itself”) apart from the thinking activity that apprehends it.
Kant famously denied that we ﬁnite human knowers are capable of
intellectual intuition.35 Winckelmann, by contrast, suggests that we
must engage in acts of intellectual intuition if we are to apprehend
the beauty “in itself” that we seek. So Winckelmann argues that one
must take risks in one’s search for the beautiful. As Winckelmann
explains, there is nothing given to our thinking activity, in advance
of the thinking activity itself, that can tell us whether or not our
thinking activity (our imitative, projective, idealizing activity) will or
will not lead to the apprehension of the beautiful (the one and the
true, the unity-in-harmony) that is sought. And this frightening lack of
any prior givenness (this lack of any previously given, determinately
available guideposts or criteria or concepts) has led some people to “err
out of caution,” for it has led them to refrain from the attempt at
projecting or idealizing. But to refrain in this way is to commit
a mistake, says Winckelmann, because without taking the risk of
projecting and idealizing (without venturing on the basis of one’s
own “biases” [Vorurtheile]), it becomes impossible for a person to
ﬁnd the beauty that might be found. And furthermore, suggests
Winckelmann, it becomes impossible even for the beauty that is
found to be the beauty that it really is in itself.36
Winckelmann’s account of “imitation,” insofar as it implies the possi-
bility of some kind of “intellectual intuition,” also implies that it is
necessary for us to think about the relation between mind and world,
subject and object, knower and known in a way that departs from the more
common (modern) way in which this relation is understood. For
Winckelmann, the unity-in-diversity that is beauty need not be restricted
to the unity-in-diversity (harmony of parts) that is observed in nature or in
35 See, for example, B 72. 36 HAA 214; GKA 185–86.
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artwork outside of us. And it need not be restricted to the unity-in-diversity
(harmony of parts, including parts that are faculties of the mind) that is
apparently found or discovered within us. Instead, for Winckelmann, the
unity-in-diversity that is beauty might also exist as an all-comprehensive
unity-in-diversity of mind and world (subject and object, knower and
known), where mind and world are parts of a larger whole and where
this larger whole – precisely because there is no mind outside of it – cannot
be apprehended as any kind of determinate, object-like thing at all.
Furthermore, if mind (i.e., if our own thinking activity) is an essential
part of this all-comprehensive unity-in-diversity (if mind is a part without
which this harmony of parts cannot be what it is), then even this all-
comprehensive unity-in-diversity (this all-comprehensive beauty) cannot
be what it is apart frommind (apart from thinking activity). Winckelmann
seems to be pointing in the direction of such an all-comprehensive, non-
object-like unity-in-diversity of mind and world when he says that, for
him, knower and known (person and thing) are not really two things but
one: “The capacity for feeling the beautiful in art is a concept that at once
encompasses within itself both the person and the thing, both that which
contains and that which is contained, but which are things that I regard as
one [ein Begriff, welcher zugleich die Person und Sache, das Enthaltende und
das Enthaltene in sich faβt, welches ich aber in eins schlieβe].”37
Finally, Winckelmann’s account of imitation (along with his impli-
cit account of intellectual intuition) entails a rather anti-Kantian
notion of freedom. For Winckelmann, human freedom is not primarily
about “autonomy” or “independence”; instead, human freedom con-
sists primarily of a kind of dual or twofold (inner and outer, spiritual
and natural) activity. Although Winckelmann himself never would
have expressed it in such ugly philosophical language, human freedom
for him consists of the dual activity of (1) the nonviolent (i.e., natural
and not externally imposed) harmonization of a given multiplicity of
parts of some natural thing seemingly external to the agent doing the
harmonizing, where this harmonization (precisely because it is not
externally imposed) is the actualization of the very being of the natural
thing that appears to be external to the agent doing the harmonizing,
and (2) simultaneously the nonviolent harmonization of a given multi-
plicity of parts internal to the agent doing the harmonizing, such that
this “internal” harmonization is the actualization of the very being of
the agent doing the harmonizing. Winckelmann would agree with
37 AFES 212/TCSB 149.
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Kant that art is deeply relevant to our vocation as free, thinking beings,
but from Winckelmann’s point of view, the “free play” of faculties that
Kant discusses (the unity-in-diversity of faculties within the ﬁnite
knowing subject) is really only a partial, one-sided, fragmentary, idio-
syncratic (and uniquely modern) expression of a more genuine and
more freedom-conducive unity-in-diversity: the unity-in-diversity that
is beauty in itself.
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